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Abstract 
According  to  “actionism”  (Noë  2010),  perception  constitutively  depends  on 
implicit knowledge of the way sensory stimulations vary as a consequence of 
the perceiver’s self-movement. My aim in this contribution is to develop an 
alternative conception of the role of action in perception present in the work 
of Gareth Evans using resources provided by Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic the-
ory of mental representation. 
Keywords: enactivism; egocentric spatial representation; visuomotor control; 
biosemantics; Gareth Evans. 
1. Introduction 
The sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (O’Regan & Noë 2001, Noë 
2004, Noë 2010, O’Regan 2012) or “actionism,” as it had been more recently 
called, is central to numerous enactivist projects in the philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science.
42 According to actionism, perceptual experience consti-
tutively  depends  on  knowledge  of  the  way  sensory  stimulation  varies  as 
a result of self-initiated, bodily movement. “For something to be visible,” Alva 
Noë writes, “…is for it to show up as standing to us in a relation of, as I will put 
it, sensorimotor perturbability. If you see something, then movements of your 
eyes or body will affect the way you experience it” (2010: 248). Actionism it is 
important to emphasize, however, distances itself from the idea that vision is 
for action, that vision is functionally dedicated, in whole or in part, to the 
guidance  of  spatially  directed bodily  movement: “actionism does  not claim 
that visual awareness depends on visuomotor skill, if by ‘visuomotor skill’ one 
                                                             
42 Enactivism isn’t so much a single, unified research perspective as it is a cluster of more or less 
closely related explanatory frameworks and philosophical methodologies, including but not lim-
ited to noncomputational and nonrepresentational dynamical systems theory, embodied cogni-
tive science, ecological psychology, vehicle externalism, naïve realism, and certain forms of exis-
tential phenomenology. 
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means the ability to make use of vision to reach out and manipulate or grasp. 
Our claim is that seeing depends on an appreciation of the sensory effects of 
movement (not, as it were, on the practical significance of sensation)…. Ac-
tionism is not committed to the general claim that seeing is a matter of know-
ing how to act in respect of or in relation to the things we see” (Noë 2010: 
249).
43  To  experience  the  three-dimensional  shape,  size,  or  orientation  of 
a rock on the beach, on this view, it thus isn’t necessary to understand, in 
a practical sense of understanding, how you would need to move your body if 
it were your purpose, say, to approach the rock, or to reach for it, or to pick it 
up in a certain way, or even to look in its direction. What is necessary, rather, 
is to understand how retinal stimulations caused by the light reflected from 
rock would change were you to act in any of these or other ways.
44 For the 
                                                             
43 There are at least two distinct senses in which seeing could be for action. Seeing could be for 
action in the sense that one of its psychological-kind-individuating functions is to guide visuomo-
tor  actions,  e.g.,  by  supplying  motor  programming  system  with  information  about  the  spatial 
properties of visible objects. Alternatively (and much less plausibly), vision could be for action in 
the sense that action guidance is its only function. Actionism denies that seeing is for  action in 
either sense. I am grateful to any anoymous referee for prompting me to make this point. 
44 One source of empirical evidence for this view comes from studies of visuomotor development 
in the absence of normal, reafferent visual stimulation. Held & Hein 1963 performed a now fa-
mous experiment in which pairs of kittens were harnessed to a carousel in a cylindrical chamber. 
One of the kittens in each pair was harnessed in such a way that it was able to engage in free 
circumambulation. The other kitten was suspended in the air in a metal gondola. When the first 
kitten walked, both kittens moved in a circle and received identical visual stimulation. However, 
only the first kitten received reafferent visual feedback as the result of self-movement. Held and 
Hein reported that only mobile kittens developed normal depth perception—as evidenced by their 
unwillingness to step over the edge of a visual cliff. Noë (2004) argues that this experiment sup-
ports the enactive approach: in order to develop normal visual depth perception, cats and other 
animals have to learn the sensory consequences of their own movements. 
There are reasons to be skeptical of this assessment. For one thing, there is evidence that passive 
transport in the gondola may have disrupted the development of the kittens’ innate paw placing 
responses to visually perceived surfaces (Ganz 1975: 206). Second, the fact that passive kittens 
were prepared to walk over the edge of a visual cliff doesn’t show that their visual experience of 
depth was abnormal. Rather, as Jesse Prinz (2005) points out, it may only indicate that they “did 
not have enough experience walking on edges to anticipate the bodily affordances of the visual 
world.” Evidence for this interpretation comes from studies of visual space perception in human 
infants. Campos et al. 1992 found that infants, ranging from 6.5 to 8.5 months, exhibit wariness of 
heights when lowered onto the deep side of a visual cliff only when they had prior experiences of 
crawling or using a walker. There is no empirical reason to think, however, that pre-locomotor 
infants in this age cohort are unable to perceive three-dimensional spatial layout (Campos 2000). 
Indeed, the available evidence suggests that just the opposite is the case (for a review, see Kellman 
& Arterberry 2006). By  one  month of life, infants  will blink  defensively  when presented with 
optical expansion patterns that normally signify an approaching object (Nanez & Yonas 1994); by 
the end of the fourth month, binocular disparity is operative (Braddick & Atkinson 1983); and by 
the  seventh  month,  infants,  regardless  of  previous  locomotor  experience,  are  sensitive  to  the 
“pictorial” cues of occlusion, familiar size, and height in the visual field, as evidenced by their 
visually guided reaching behavior (Granrud & Yonas 1984, Granrud et al. 1985, Arterberry 2008). 
Summarizing decades of developmental evidence, Kellman and Arterberry write: “Before craw-AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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actionist, the possession of visuomotor skill or “know-how” isn’t required for 
visual awareness of the way objects fill out surrounding space. 
I have elsewhere engaged in detailed criticism of the actionist approach (Bris-
coe  2008a,  Briscoe  forthcoming,  Briscoe  and  Grush  in  preparation).  Like 
a number of other philosophers, I am skeptical both about its internal coher-
ence and empirical tenability (Block 2003, 2005, 2012; Prinz 2006, 2012; Mat-
then 2006; Schwitzgebel 2006; Clark 2009, 2012). I won’t attempt to summarize 
the state of the debate here. My aim, instead, is to lay out an alternative con-
ception of the role of action in perception present in the work of Gareth Evans 
(1982, 1985), one that I think is far more consistent with mainstream empirical 
research in perceptual psychology and cognitive neuroscience and that has 
yet to be developed, I think, in a sufficiently careful and systematic way. Un-
like proponents of actionism, Evans does not look to knowledge of the proxi-
mal sensory consequences of movement in order to explain how perception 
acquires its spatial content. Rather, he looks to the functional role played by 
perception in adapting the agent’s bodily actions to the spatial layout of the 
distal environment. Unlike actionism, Evans’ theory is committed to the claim 
that “seeing is a matter of knowing how to act in respect of or in relation to 
the  things  we  see”  and,  so,  to  the  constitutive  dependence  of  visuospatial 
awareness on the possession of visuomotor skill. 
Here is an overview of the rest of this paper. In section 2, I present an inter-
pretation of four claims central to Evans’s theory of the egocentric spatial con-
tent of perception. I also answer objections to Evans’s theory that arise from 
a failure to distinguish between the objective spatial content of a perceptual 
experience and the experience’s motoric significance for the perceiving sub-
ject. In section 3, I then show that Evans’ theory can be helpfully elaborated 
using  resources  provided  by  Ruth  Millikan’s  biosemantic  theory  of  men-
tal representation. 
 
2. Evans on the role of action in perception 
The idea that action and perception are closely related is neither new, nor 
especially radical. Many philosophical and psychological theories of vision in 
the last 300 years have looked to capacities for embodied, visuomotor action 
to explain how visual experience acquires its spatial representational content 
(for  a  review,  see  Briscoe  and  Grush  in  preparation).  One  historically  im-
portant source of motivation for this approach is the empiricist doctrine that 
                                                                                                                                                             
ling, infants perceive depth; what may change with crawling experience is the coordination of 
depth and surface perception with their own motion in space” (1998: 261). An analogous conclu-
sion can plausibly be drawn with respect to Held and Hein’s kittens. 
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vision  must be  “educated”  by  the  sense  of  touch—understood as  including 
both kinaesthesis and proprioceptive position sense—if the former is to ac-
quire  its  outward,  three-dimensional  spatial  significance.  Normal  vision, 
Berkeley  influentially  argued  in  his  New  Theory  (1709/2008),  results  only 
when  tangible  ideas  of  distance  (derived  from  experiences  of  unimpeded 
movement) and solid shape (derived from experiences of contact and differ-
ential resistance) are elicited by the visible ideas of light and color with which 
they have been habitually connected. A long line of philosophers including 
Condillac, Reid, Smith, Mill, Bain, and Dewey accepted the basics of Berkeley’s 
account of the relation between sight and touch.  
A second important source of motivation for action-oriented approaches to 
perception is teleological. From an biological or evolutionary standpoint, it is 
reasonable  to  think  that  vision  is  for  action,  that  its  preeminent  biological 
function is to adapt an animal’s bodily movements to the properties of the 
environment that it inhabits. This view is widely accepted in the neuroscience 
of visuomotor control: “the functional organization of the visual system (like 
the rest of the brain),” Melvyn Goodale writes, “has been ultimately shaped by 
the role it plays in the control of movement” (Goodale 2011: 1568). It is also 
clearly reflected in externalist or “anti-individualist” approaches to perceptual 
content in the philosophy of mind. “The representational content of an ani-
mal’s perceptual states,” as Tyler Burge puts it, “is individuated partly in terms 
of what causes those states and how those states enable the animal to cope 
with  specific types  entities  in  its  environment.  Successful  interactions  help 
ground individuation of perceptual states partly in terms of representational 
content” (2005: 5). Seeing, of course, subserves a variety of other important 
purposes besides the guidance of actions—its contents are both directive and 
descriptive (Millikan 2004)—but this is plausibly one of its biologically central 
and psychological-kind-individuating functions. 
Yet a third source motivation comes from skepticism about the explanatory 
adequacy of alternative approaches. Most philosophers of mind, it is fair to 
say,  now  concur that representation  is  a  functional  kind. A mental  state  is 
a vehicle of representation content only if it used in certain ways, only if it 
plays a certain role in the agent’s cognitive economy. It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that perceptual states acquire spatial contentfulness in virtue of their 
role in propositional inference (for instance, in propositional, spatial reason-
ing).  Indeed,  capacities  for  propositional  inference  seem  neither  necessary 
nor sufficient for perceptual spatial representation. They don’t seem neces-
sary because young human infants and many animals that lack capacities for 
propositional  inference  are  evidently  three-dimensional  space  perceivers. 
And they don’t seem sufficient because there are good reasons to think that 
the spatial content of perception is, in general, nonconceptual—and, so, con-
stitutively  independent  of  having  capacities  for  propositionally  articulated AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
203 
 
reasoning (for discussion, see the essays collected in Gunther 2003, Bermúdez 
2007, and Burge 2010, chap. 11). 
In Chapter 6 of The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans argues that 
perceptual states acquire their nonconceptual spatial contents in virtue of the 
role  they play  in  the guidance  of  spatially directed  motor actions.  The  ap-
proach Evans develops is structured by four main claims: 
(1) The spatial content of perceptual experience is subject-relative or “egocen-
tric” (if not exclusively so). “The subject hears the sound as coming from such-
and-such a position, but how is the position to be specified? Presumably in ego-
centric terms…. These terms specify the position of the sound in relation to the 
observer’s own body” (1982: 155). 
(2) We perceive egocentric spatial properties using the same spatial coding sys-
tem or “frame of reference” as is used for purposes of forming and implement-
ing our intentions for object-directed bodily actions. “Egocentric spatial terms 
are the terms in which the content of our spatial experiences would be formu-
lated, and those in which our immediate behavioral plans would be expressed” 
(1982: 154). 
(3) Our perception of an object’s egocentric spatial properties is constitutively 
connected with having certain dispositions to engage in bodily actions targeted 
on or otherwise directed in relation to the object. “[W]e must say that having 
spatially significant perceptual information consists at least partly in being dis-
posed to do various things” (1982: 155). 
(4) Perceptual information about an object’s position in egocentric space is not 
information about a special kind of space, but rather information of a special 
kind about space. “It is perfectly consistent with the sense I have assigned to 
[egocentric spatial] vocabulary that its terms should refer to points in a public 
three-dimensional space” (1982: 157). 
My aim in this section is to interpret these claims by clarifying them and relat-
ing them to one another. I shall also answer objections to Evans’s account that 
arise, I suggest, from a failure to distinguish between the objective, egocen-
tric spatial  content  of  a  visual  experience  and  its  motoric  significance  for 
the perceiving subject (Claim 4). Although I shall be focusing on the case of 
conscious vision, points made here are intended to generalize to other sensory 
modalities. 
Let’s begin with Claim 1. According to Claim 1, visual experience represents 
the egocentric spatial properties of visible objects and surfaces, that is, their 
spatial relations to the perceiving subject. Thus, when you see a plate on the 
table, you see among other things its direction and distance from your own 
body as well as its three-dimensional orientation relative to your line of sight. 
Claim 1, it is important to stress, does not exclude the possibility that visual 
experiences also represent various allocentric spatial properties and relations. Spatial Content and Motoric Significance 
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E.g., in addition to seeing the plate’s location relative to your own body, you 
may also see its position relative to a nearby fork and saltcellar. 
Three remarks should be made about Claim 1. First, there is psychophysical 
evidence that at close range and under ecologically normal viewing conditions 
our ability consciously to perceive egocentric spatial layout is highly accurate. 
While perceived distances are significantly foreshortened for objects located 
more than 30 meters away, in what Cutting and Vishton (1995) call vista space, 
the egocentric distances of objects located up to 2 meters away, in personal 
space, are perceived with nearly metric accuracy.
45 Although proponents of 
the  dual  systems  model  of  visual  processing  (Milner  &  Goodale  1995/2006, 
Goodale & Milner 2004) have maintained that conscious vision does not make 
use of an egocentric spatial coding system, this claim, I would suggest, is flatly 
inconsistent with mainstream psychophysical work in perceptual psychology 
(see Briscoe 2008b, 2009 and Briscoe & Schwenkler forthcoming). 
Second, Claim 1 is a claim about the spatial contents of visual experience—
about which objective (but subject-relative) spatial properties are represented 
in visual experience—and as such does not by itself entrain any specific com-
mitments about the system of egocentric spatial representation used to encode 
those  contents.  Indeed,  possible  perceptual  mental  representations  with 
a given egocentric spatial content, as Christopher Peacocke points out, stand 
in a many-one relation to the content itself (1992: 65). Knowing which spatial 
properties are encoded by a system of spatial representation S does not by 
itself tell us how those properties are encoded by S. 
Third, Claim 1 by itself does not identify the location of the self or ego in rela-
tion to which egocentric spatial properties are supposed to be represented in 
visual experience. Indeed, it does not indicate whether there is a single, privi-
leged locus in (or on) the body that counts as the center of visual egocentric 
space and, so, does not indicate whether the ego qua perceiving subject is lit-
erally a point of view—in the world only “geometrically,” as John McDowell 
puts it (1994, 104). This means that, in addition to the leaving the nature of the 
spatial coding system used in visual experience indeterminate, Claim 1 also 
leaves  indeterminate  how  that  system  is to  be aligned  with  the  perceiving 
subject’s body. 
Although this may seem like a straightforward phenomenological question, it 
is not. In fact, different philosophers influenced by Evans’s account have giv-
en  quite  different answers to  it.  Christopher  Peacocke  (1992),  for  instance, 
                                                             
45 The difference in precision is a function of the spatial information available to the visual sys-
tem. Estimates of depth for objects in personal space are powerfully constrained by stereopsis, 
convergence, and accommodation. As distances lengthen, these binocular sources of depth infor-
mation drop off in effectiveness, and the visual system must rely increasingly on somewhat less 
precise monocular or “pictorial” cues in the light sampled by the eyes. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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maintains that visual experiences represent the way visible surfaces are ar-
rayed in three-dimensional space relative to a point placed in the subject’s 
torso. By contrast, Jose Bermúdez (1998: 2005) identifies the ego at the center 
of visual egocentric space with the apex of the solid angle of the visual field, 
while Quassim Cassam (1997) identifies the ego with the living, acting body as 
a whole (what he calls the “bodily self”). 
One reason why visual phenomenology is not decisive here, I would suggest, is 
that there is disagreement about what counts as distinctively visual experi-
ence of space. In particular, when we say that we visually perceive the spatial 
relations in which certain objects stand to ourselves, what role does proprio-
ception play in the representation of those spatial relations? Consider the case 
of seeing an object’s (radial) direction. If Bermúdez is right, then visual expe-
rience only represents the object’s direction from you relative to a point mid-
way between your eyes. In this case, your representation of the tree’s egocen-
tric direction is fully independent of concurrent proprioceptive information, 
whether conscious or nonconscious, about the spatial configuration of the rest 
of your body. 
Peacocke, by contrast, maintains that the directional axes used to specify the 
spatial content of a visual experience originate from a point in the center of 
the torso. “The appropriate set of labeled axes,” he writes, “captures distinc-
tions  in  the  phenomenology  of  experience  itself.  Looking  straight  ahead at 
Buckingham Palace is one experience. It is another to look at the palace with 
one’s face still toward it but with one’s body turned toward a point on the 
right. In this second case the palace is experienced as being off to one side 
from  the  direction  of straight  ahead,  even  if  the  view  remains  exactly  the 
same as in the first case” (1992: 62). The visual system, however, initially en-
codes an object’s location relative to the eye (that is, in retinocentric coordi-
nates). Representing an object’s location in visual experience relative to the 
torso thus presupposes prior integration of visual information about the ob-
ject’s eye-relative location with proprioceptive information about the spatial 
configuration of the body, in particular, information about the direction of 
gaze  and  the  orientation  of  the  head.  We  could  call  this  a  “visuo-
proprioceptive” representation of the palace’s direction. 
Something similar, of course, seems possible in respect of other propriocep-
tively represented parts of the body, for example, the head, shoulder, or hand. 
If so, then there needn’t be a single bodily locus that, in general, counts as you 
for purposes of characterizing your visually perceived spatial relations to an 
object. The ego at the center of perceptual egocentric space, as suggested by 
Cassam, may spread to encompass the body as a whole.
46 
                                                             
46 This does not assume that the perceiver is delivered in visual experience with a complete and 
uniformly detailed representation of an object’s location relative to every part of her body at the Spatial Content and Motoric Significance 
 
206 
 
I  will  not  attempt  to  adjudicate  between  these  different  views  here.
47  It  is 
enough  to  point  out  that  which  egocentric  spatial  relations  one  takes  to 
be represented  in  visual  experience depends  on where  one  locates  the ego 
at the center of visual egocentric space, and this, in turn, depends in part on 
how one conceives of the relationship between conscious vision and bodily 
proprioception. 
Claim 1 was a claim at the level of objective spatial representational content. 
Claim 2, by contrast, is a claim at the level of spatial representational format. 
According to Claim 2, we perceive egocentric spatial properties using the same 
spatial coding scheme as is used for purposes of forming and implementing 
our intentions for spatially directed movement and action. As Evans puts it, 
“Egocentric spatial terms are the terms in which the content of our spatial 
experiences would be formulated, and those in which our immediate behav-
ioral plans would be expressed” (1982: 154). 
One motivation for Claim 2 is presumably that, in order to form intentions for 
bodily actions directed in relation to an object, it is necessary to locate the 
object’s position in three-dimensional space relative to the current location of 
one’s own body (or parts thereof). E.g., in order to pick a peach it is not suffi-
cient to have allocentric information about the peach’s location relative to the 
rest of the scene, you must also have egocentric information about its position 
relative to the current location of your hand. It is in this sense, to a first ap-
proximation, that both perception and action make use of a common, egocen-
tric way of representing objects in space. 
As an aside, I should mention that it does not follow from the fact that it is 
possible to specify an object’s perceived position in egocentric space using the 
subject-centered axes left/right, above/below, and in front of/behind that a spa-
tial coding system based on these axes is actually used to plan actions directed 
in relation to the object. Indeed, behavioral and neurophysiological studies 
rather suggest that visuomotor activity is typically subserved by a variety of 
coordinated, effector-specific spatial coding systems, some of which represent 
object locations not in extrinsic, directional terms, but rather in intrinsic, kin-
ematic terms (Scott 2008, Kalaska 2009).  
                                                                                                                                                             
same time. The idea is rather that, when she perceives an object’s position in visual egocentric 
space, it may be any part of her body of which she is proprioceptively aware in relation to which 
the object’s position is perceived. See Briscoe 2009: 425-426. 
47 Although I think that a verdict here should be based, in part, on a theory’s ability to explain the 
phenomenon of visual direction constancy. E.g., Peacocke must explain why the tree’s direction 
appears stable when I maintain fixation on the tree, but rotate my torso to the right, if the tree’s 
unchanging position relative to my eyes is not also represented in visual experience. See Wu 2014 
for a recent argument that the experience of visual direction constancy requires an encoding of 
perceived object locations in one or more non-retinocentric, egocentric frames of reference.  AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Tim Crane (2009) points out that it does not follow from the fact that it is pos-
sible to describe the content of a perceptual experience using a proposition 
that the inner representational vehicle of that experience is itself proposition-
al or sentence-like. I am making a similar point here about egocentric spatial 
representation. We need to distinguish between a specification of the objec-
tive content of an egocentric spatial representation R, which may be charac-
terized  using  any  geometrically  adequate  system  of  spatial  representation, 
and a specification of the system of spatial representation actually used to 
construct R. 
Let’s turn to Claim 3. It deals, importantly, with the relationship between what 
we see and what we do. One way of interpreting Claim 3 would be as insisting 
that the egocentric spatial content of a visual experience is not constitutively 
independent of its motoric significance for the perceiving subject. By the mo-
toric significance of a visual experience, I intend its functional role in plan-
ning spatially directed bodily actions in light of the agent’s current motiva-
tions, beliefs,  objectives,  etc.  There  is a clear  connection  between  this  way 
reading Claim 3 and Jesse Prinz’s recent proposal that conscious perceptual 
experience functions as a menu for action: “Consciousness makes information 
available for decisions about what to do, and it exists for that purpose” (Prinz 
2012: 203).  
Two remarks are important. First, Claim 3 connects having spatially signifi-
cant perceptual information with having “dispositions to do various things.” 
Why? One thought is that Evans intended to establish certain general, non-
intentionally characterizable necessary conditions for perceptual spatial rep-
resentation (see, e.g., Noë 2004, chap. 3). I think that this behaviorist interpre-
tation of Evans’s project in chapter 6 of The Varieties of Reference is mistaken. 
Evans, in several places, is explicit that dispositions to spatial behavior need 
not be directly induced by perceptual inputs, but may be, as he says, “condi-
tional also on other beliefs and desires” (1982: 155, fn. 23). A subject, capable 
of reasoning, will be disposed to engage in an action directed in relation to 
certain a region of egocentric space only “when [her] thoughts make it appro-
priate” (1982: 161, fn. 33) or when it seems a “good thing to do” (1982: 161). 
She will not normally form a disposition to advance in the perceived direction 
of angry rattlesnake or to reach for a red-hot poker, for example, unless her 
circumstances provide her with compelling reasons to do so. In general, Ev-
ans’ dispositions to spatial behavior appear to be propensities to respond to 
the spatial structure of the environment in ways that are intelligible in light of 
the subject’s cognitive and motivational states. They are not dispositions to 
behavior in the sense of the classical behaviorist. What matters, for Evans, is 
knowing how to act in response to the perceptual inputs in ways that make 
rational sense. 
 Spatial Content and Motoric Significance 
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Second, it is important not to collapse the distinction between the egocentric 
spatial  content  of a  visual  experience  and  its motoric  significance.  Evans’s 
view is not that the egocentric spatial content of a perceptual experience just 
is its “behavioral spatial purport,” to use Rick Grush’s (2007) term. It is one 
thing to specify the egocentric spatial content of a visual experience, say, that 
an object is located in a certain direction and at a certain distance in depth 
from the subject. It is quite another to provide an account of what makes it the 
case that, for any given egocentric spatial content, the subject is having a visu-
al experience with that content and not some other.
48 Evans’s proposal is that 
such an adequately individuating account of the egocentric spatial contents of 
perceptual experience must advert to the subject’s abilities to engage in bodily 
actions targeted on or otherwise directed in relation to environing objects and 
surfaces.  Motoric  significance  is  that  in  virtue  of  which  visual  experiences 
have objective, egocentric spatial content. This proposal, however, should not 
be taken to imply that the egocentric spatial content of a visual experience is 
identical to its motoric significance. The latter is not what we see when we 
have a visual experience with a certain spatial content. Rather, it is part of 
having a visual experience with that content and not some other. (Compare 
the proposal that a statement S must play a certain inferential role in order to 
have the semantic property of being true just in case Edinburgh is east of Glas-
gow, but west of Oxford. This proposal clearly does not imply that S’s truth-
condition is in any sense identical to its role in inference.) 
This, I take it, is the point Evans is making with Claim 4: 
…when I speak of information “specifying a position in egocentric space,” I am 
talking not of information about a special kind of space, but of a special kind of 
information about space—information whose content is specifiable in an ego-
centric spatial vocabulary. It is perfectly consistent with the sense I have as-
signed to this vocabulary that its terms should refer to points in a public three-
dimensional space (1982: 157).
  
The claim that the egocentric spatial content of a visual experience is deter-
mined by its motoric significance for the perceiving subject thus is a claim not 
about what the visual experience represents (it is not a claim at the level of 
reference), but a claim about the conditions under which a visual experience 
will have such content. When a subject perceives an object’s egocentric loca-
tion, the information about space in her possession is “special” because it is 
poised to guide her actions in relation to the object. It is consistent with this 
suggestion,  however,  that  egocentric  spatial  properties  represented  in  her 
perception  are  objective  (if  subject-relative)  properties  of  things  in  public, 
three-dimensional space. 
                                                             
48 This formulation is the perceptual analogue of Peacocke’s “Discrimination Principle” for the 
conceptual contents of thought. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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A number of philosophers have failed adequately to enforce the distinction 
between egocentric spatial content and what I am calling motoric significance. 
For example, Adrian Cussins, in a discussion of the spatial content of auditory 
perception, writes: 
Evans’s idea is that the spatial content of the auditory perception has to be speci-
fied in terms of a set of conceptually unmediated abilities… to move in the ego-
centric space around the organism. This is because the content consists in the 
experiential availability to the subject of a dispositional ability to move. The ex-
periential content of perception is specified in terms of certain fundamental skills 
which the organism possesses (1990: 397, emphasis added).  
One natural objection to saying that the egocentric spatial content of a percep-
tual experience consists in having certain abilities to move one’s body is that 
there are indefinitely many different ways in which a perceiver may elect to 
respond to the perceived spatial structure of the environment. As Mohan Mat-
then writes, “there is no such thing as the proper response, or even a range of 
functionally  appropriate  responses,  to  what  perception  tells  us” (1988:  20). 
The egocentric spatial content of a visual experience, for Evans, however, does 
not consist “in the experiential availability to the subject of a dispositional 
ability to move.” Motoric significance is that in virtue of which a visual experi-
ence has egocentric spatial content. It is not identical to (the same thing as) its 
egocentric spatial content. 
John  Campbell  (2005)  also  seems  to  elide  the  egocentric  spatial  content  of 
a visual experience with its motor significance in a discussion of Evans. Ac-
cording to Campbell, Evans’s egocentric spatial representations identify the 
locations of objects “merely as affordances,” as possible ways of moving and 
acting (2005: 200). Campbell rightly balks at this proposal: “The trouble with 
this gloss on the content of egocentric identifications of location is that we 
would ordinarily take spatial location to be the categorical basis of these af-
fordances. That is, we think that it is the relative locations of the thing and the 
agent that explain why it is possible for the agent to act on the thing. We do 
not suppose that egocentric location is actually constituted by the possibility 
of the agent acting on the thing” (2005: 201). 
Evans, however, on the interpretation offered here, does not collapse the dis-
tinction between what we see and what we do in this way. The point to em-
phasize is that egocentric spatial information is not information about a spe-
cial kind of space, a space of Gibsonian affordances, but rather information of 
a special kind about space, information poised to guide actions that are sensi-
tive to the spatial properties of the objects around us. The claim that “having 
spatially significant perceptual information consists at least partly in being 
disposed to do various things” (Evans 1982: 155) does not imply that such in-
formation is constituted by (or about) what one is disposed to do. It is having 
spatially significant perceptual information that, for Evans, partly consists in Spatial Content and Motoric Significance 
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being disposed to do various things, not the information itself. As Jesse Prinz 
has forcefully argued, perceptual experience from a functional standpoint can 
be for action without being constituted by action (Prinz 2012: 211). 
Last, if a “sensorimotor chauvinist,” in Andy Clark’s (2009) sense, is someone 
who maintains that any difference in the motor activities to which a percep-
tion may give rise constitutes a difference in the perception’s content, then it 
is clear that Evans is not a sensorimotor chauvinist. He respects the distinction 
between the content of a representation and the use to which that representa-
tion is put by its motoric consumers. One implication is that different perceiv-
ers (even those belonging to different species) may, in principle, have visual 
experiences  with  the  same  egocentric  spatial  contents  despite  having  very 
different  motor  skills.  Thus,  I  and  an  orangutan  may  both  see  that  a  tree 
branch is, e.g., at certain orientation in depth even though the motoric signifi-
cance of the orangutan’s visual experience is no doubt very different than that 
of my own visual experience. It is a significant merit of the present interpreta-
tion of Evans’s theory, I take it, that it enables Evans to sidestep the charge of 
sensorimotor  chauvinism  sometimes  leveled  against  action-oriented  ap-
proaches to the spatial contents of perceptual experience. 
 
3. Looking at Action-Oriented Represenation  
from a Biosemantic Perspective 
Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of mental representation (Millikan 1989, 
1995, 2004), I would suggest, provides us with resources for developing Evans’ 
approach with a bit more detail. According to the biosemantic theory, an item 
R0 will function as a representation of some structured aspect of the distal 
environment E0 only if two conditions obtain: 
Guidance: R0’s function or purpose is to guide a consumer in the perfor-
mance of some type of task T (or a range of different types of tasks), 
where the consumer’s successful performance of T depends on the fact 
that E0 obtains. 
Systematicity: The way the consumer is guided by R0 systematically de-
pends on R0’s structure or composition, such that had some variant of R0 
(R1,… Rn) been produced instead of R0, then the consumer’s way of per-
forming T would have proved successful only if instead of E0 there had 
been some corresponding variant (E1,… En). 
The idea that perceptual awareness of viewer-relative spatial layout constitu-
tively involves a kind of bodily readiness for action—Claim 3 above—can be 
elaborated using versions of these two conditions. Assume that R0 was pro-
duced by a perceptual input system of some kind. Then, R0 will represent the AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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instantiation of a determinate egocentric spatial property G0, e.g., a certain 
viewpoint-relative distance or direction, by an object O only if:  
Motor Guidance: R0’s function or purpose is to guide motor consumers in 
the performance of some type of action A (or a range of different types 
of actions), where successful performance of A depends on the instantia-
tion of G0 by O. 
Motor Systematicity: The way motor consumers are guided by R0 sys-
tematically  depends  on  R0’s  structure  or  composition,  such  that  had 
some variant of R0 (R1,… Rn) been produced instead of R0, then their way 
of performing A would have proved successful only if instead of instan-
tiating G0 some corresponding determinate of the same determinable 
property (G1,… Gn) had been instantiated by O. 
We can consider these two requirements in relation to a toy model of how 
connectionist neural networks handle the problem of sensorimotor coordina-
tion devised by Paul Churchland (1986, 2012). The model involves a virtual, 
robotic crab with a two-jointed moveable arm and eyes that can rotate 90 
from side to side (Figure 1). The crab represents the location (x, y) of an object 
in front of it using a sensory activation vector (i, i), where x and y specify the 
object’s placement in a two-dimensional coordinate system centered on the 
hinge of the crab’s shoulder and where i and i are the input activation levels 
corresponding,  respectively,  to  the  rotation  angles    and    of  its  left  and 
right eyes. 
The crab’s task is to move its arm so as to position the tip of its pincer on the 
(x, y) coordinates of a reachable object O. That arm position will require the 
crab’s shoulder and elbow to assume a pair of angles (, ). For example, if O is 
located at the point encoded by eye-angles (62, 98), then the crab’s shoulder 
and elbow joints must assume the angle pair (60, 47). In order to perform 
this task, the crab’s neural network is trained to transform the eye-angle input 
vector (i, i) into a motor output vector (o, o), where o is output activation 
level corresponding to the shoulder angle  and o is the output activation lev-
el corresponding to the elbow angle .  
It is easy to see that Churchland’s crab meets the Motor Guidance require-
ment: a given eye-rotation-angle activation pair in the crab’s input layer (i, i) 
represents the distal location (x, y) of an object O because the vector’s function 
is to guide the way the crab reaches toward O, and the crab will only reach 
toward O successfully only if O is situated at (x, y). The crab also meets the 
Motor Systematicity requirement: For any reachable location (x, y), there is 
a corresponding vector (i, i)) in the crab's sensory input layer. To each such 
input vector, in turn, there is a corresponding vector (o, o) in the crab’s mo-
tor output layer that will guide the tip of the crab’s pincer to (x, y). In other Spatial Content and Motoric Significance 
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words, variations in O’s distance and direction systematically give rise to vari-
ations in sensory input which, in turn, systematically give rise to variations in 
object-directed motor output. There is a one-to-one mapping from points in 
objective space to points in visual space to points in motor space. 
 
Figure 1. A robotic crab with an extendable arm and rotatable eyes 
From Paul Churchland. 2012. Plato's Camera: How the Physical Brain Captures  
a Landscape of Abstract Universals. Plate 3 © Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  
by permission of The MIT Press. 
I will close with a few brief remarks about this example. First, the robotic crab 
example is deliberately simple. Besides having more sophisticated perceptual 
systems, real-world sensorimotor agents typically have a wide array of con-
trollable  body  parts,  access  to  proprioceptive/kinaesthetic  information  con-
cerning their movements, and the ability to select goals and types of actions to 
perform on the basis of their beliefs and current needs.  
When  we  scale  up,  in particular,  when  the way consuming  motor  systems 
respond to inputs from perceptual producers in guiding actions depends, in 
part, on belief- and desire-sensitive practical reasoning, there will be no sim-
ple relationship between sensory inputs and motor outputs. Hence, as Mat-
then  says,  there  will  be  no  such  thing  as  the  functionally  proper response 
to what is perceived. (Indeed, much of the time, the correct response to the AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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representation will be to do nothing at all, to ignore the bit of reality that the 
representation reveals.)  
This is not a problem for the approach sketched here. For purposes of content-
individuation, what is important from the standpoint of the biosemantic in-
terpretation of Evans’ theory is not uniformity in the effects a perceptual rep-
resentation has on its consumers, but rather uniformity in the worldly condi-
tion under which consumer responses, however diverse these may be, will 
prove successful. As Millikan writes, “if the position of the chair in the room 
does not correspond, so, to my visual representation of its position, that will 
hinder me equally in my attempts to avoid the chair when passing through 
the room, to move the chair, to sit in it, to remove the cat from it,… etc.” (Milli-
kan 1989: 289).  
Perception and action, then, although less closely linked, are not decoupled in 
sophisticated sensorimotor agency. For any determinate, spatial property G, 
there will be indefinitely many different ways in which the agent might re-
spond to the experience of G’s instantiation by an object in her field of view. 
What matters to Evans’ approach, as reconstructed in this section, however, is 
not  which  of  various  possible  actions  the  agent actually  selects for  perfor-
mance. Rather, what matters is that the agent’s visual experience is poised to 
guide a range of actions directed in relation to the object and that the way any 
given action in the range is performed depends for its success on G’s being 
instantiated. When an experience is poised in this way, it equips the agent 
with the practical know-how needed to interact with the object in G-sensi-
tive ways.  
The second point is that such know-how need not be implemented in order to 
have the experience in question. Having the experience is dependent on hav-
ing the capacity to perform G-sensitive actions rather than on its overt actual-
ization  (see  Schellenberg  2007  for  discussion  of  this  idea).  What  matters 
to seeing an object’s direction, for example, is not acting on one’s capacity to 
walk  (or  run  or  crawl)  in  its  direction,  but  knowing  how  one  would  have 
to move one’s body in order to do so. Evans’ theory does not have the implau-
sible implication that an agent who is paralyzed or unable to move her body—
say because she has been buried up to her neck in sand—is thereby unable 
perceive  the  spatial  attributes  of  the  objects  that  surround  her.  So  long 
as  she  has  the  right  sort  of  practical  know-how,  she  qualifies  as  a  fully-
fledged space perceiver. 
Third, the distinction between an experience’s objective spatial content and its 
motoric significance for the perceiving subject (Claim 4) can be clearly drawn 
within the biosemantic framework: the spatial content of a given perceptual 
representation—in the crab example, this representation will be a given sen-
sory input vector (i, i)—is not identified with the functions or activities per-
formed by its “downstream” motoric consumers, with what its motoric con-Spatial Content and Motoric Significance 
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sumers do. Rather, it is identified with the way the world needs to be if the 
representation’s motoric consumers are to perform their functions successful-
ly—here  the  way  object  O  must  be  situated  in  front  of  the  crab  if  the  (i, 
i)(o, o) transformation is to result in successful reaching.  
It is thus possible to maintain that perceptual representations acquire spatial 
significance in virtue of their functional role in guiding actions without col-
lapsing the distinction between the way the distal world is represented as be-
ing in perception and the subject’s motoric responses to the world. Objects are 
not represented merely as things that can be acted upon thus-and-so, but as 
having the intrinsic and relational spatial properties that afford possibilities 
for action. 
Finally, human perceptual systems produce representations that are not lim-
ited in their function to action-guidance, but that also play a role in high-level 
object recognition, imaginative problem-solving, and intersubjective commu-
nication. As Noë argues, it would thus be “dogmatic to suppose that the only 
aim of vision is action” (2010: 248). The Motor Guidance requirement, howev-
er, does not entail commitment to this dogmatic supposition. To insist that the 
spatial content of a perceptual state derives from the state’s functional role in 
action-guidance is not to deny that the state may serve a wide variety of other 
purposes as well. The Motor Guidance requirement in no way precludes a role 
for space-representing perception in forms of problem-solving that are related 
only in a very indirect ways to negotiating and interacting with the three-
dimensional  environment.  Perceptual  experience,  from  a  functional  stand-
point, can be for action without being exclusively for action. 
 
4. Conclusion 
There is obviously much more that needs to be said about and in defense of 
Evans’ approach to the relationship between action and perception. I have not 
said anything, in particular, about empirical objections to the approach prem-
ised  on  the  dual  systems  model  of  visual  processing  (Milner  &  Goodale 
1995/2006; Clark 2001, 2007; Goodale & Milner 2004).
49 I hope however to have 
shown in this brief treatment that there is a coherent alternative to actionism, 
one  that  looks  to  embodied  interaction  with the distal  environment  rather 
than to knowledge of the sensory consequences of movement to explain the 
spatial contentfulness of perceptual experience.
50 
 
                                                             
49 But see Briscoe 2008b, 2009 and Briscoe & Schwenkler forthcoming. 
50 For helpful discussion of an earlier version of this paper, I am grateful to James Genone and 
Wayne Wu. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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